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SOME RECENT DEFINITIONS OF GERMAN 
ROMANTICISM, OR THE CASE 
AGAINST DIALECTICS 
by Robert L. Kahn 
When the time came for me to be seriously thinking about writing this 
paper-and you can see from the title and description that I gave myself 
plenty of leeway-I was caught in a dilemma. In the beginning my plan 
had been simple enough: I wanted to present a report on the latest develop- 
ments in the scholarship of German Romanticism. As it turned out, I had 
believed very rashly and naively that I could carry on where Julius Peter- 
sen's eclectic and tolerant book Die Wesensbestimmung der deutschen 
Romantik (Leipzig, 1926), Josef Komer's fragmentary and unsystematic 
reviews in the Marginalien (Frankfurt a. M., 1950), and Franz Schultz's 
questioning, though irresolute, paper "Der gegenwartige Stand der Roman- 
tikforschungM1 had left off. As a matter of fact, I wrote such an article, 
culminating in what I then considered to be a novel definition of German 
Romanticism. But the more I thought about the problem, the less I liked 
what I had done. It slowly dawned on me that I had been proceeding on a 
false course of inquiry, and eventually I was forced to reconsider several 
long-cherished views and to get rid of certain basic assumptions which 
I had come to recognize as illusory and prejudicial. 
It  became increasingly obvious to me that as a conscientious literary 
historian I could not discuss new contributions to Romantic scholarship 
in vacuo, but that I was under an obligation to relate the spirit of these 
pronouncements to our own times, as much as to relate their substance to 
the period in question. From this it followed that I had to arrive at my own 
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definition and judgment of the historical process, and eventually I was 
compelled to review the very foundations on which that branch of our 
discipline called "Literaturgeschichte" rests which, as we all know, owes 
its origin and most of its methods and goals to the Romantic era. I, there- 
fore, beg your indulgence for presenting my conclusions in a rather "ego- 
centric" manner, for devoting most of my time to the consideration of 
certain fundamental issues which are theoretical and speculative by the 
very nature of the subject, and for treating these problems rather broadly, 
It seems to me that we have reached a crucial point in our investigation 
and treatment of all historical literature, not only of the Romantic period. 
On the one hand, we are the heirs of Positivism, which has furnished us 
with splendid editions of the works of our authors, with minute and detailed 
information about their lives, with almost all available facts about both. 
The mass of material handed on by this group of scholars is overwhelming, 
as all of us can testify. Who of us today would dare write a study of Tieck, 
as Rudolf Haym did almost one hundred years ago in his Die romantische 
Schule (1870), based on only two available editions of letters? The true 
Positivist, as I have tried to describe him elsewhere in the person of 
Professor K ~ r n e r , ~  was in the main content to collect data, hopefully 
leaving the interpretation to others. Fritz Jonas' proud, though perhaps 
somewhat ironical, motto to the Erlauterungen der Jugendgedichte Schillers 
(Berlin, 1900), "Wenn die Konige bau'n, haben die Karrner zu thun" 
(p. [5]), is the motto of this school. Our great "historisch-kritische" 
editions, from Minde-Pouet-Steig-Schmidt's Kleist to Sauer's Grillparzer, 
the Sophien-Ausgabe of Goethe and the Suphan edition of Herder, the 
"Briefe" published by Leitzmann, Jonas, and Geiger, and Biedermann's 
"Gesprache" are due to its indefatigable efforts. 
We are the heirs of this movement, as we are of "Geistesgeschichte," 
which first rose to attack Positivism whose methods borrowed from the 
natural sciences it deplored. The "GeistesgeschichtJer" believed in grasping 
the essence of literature via its philosophical, social, political and religious 
content and circumstances. They stressed the cultural view, the totality of 
intellectual history, focusing their attention chiefly on the author, not the 
work of art. Poetry to them meant most often simply "philosophical ideas 
in dil~tion."~ Their favorite concepts were "Weltanschauung," "Zeitgeist," 
and "Einflup," and they delighted in positing various intellectual typologies 
and polarities, reducing thought and emotion to basic parallels and analo- 
gies. Like Positivism, "Geistesgeschichte" laid claim to being a science, 
albeit of history, and Wilhelm Dilthey in his study of Novalis (written 
1865) in Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung (1905) could still speak of "die 
Wissenschaft," "Verfahren," and "strenge Erkenntnis" in one breath. 
We have lost this certainty and conviction of the nineteenth century 
and our approach is largely experimental, tending towards the appreciation 
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of the individual and subjective aspects of the work of art and its author. 
I must plead guilty for having in the past considered myself a staunch 
member of the "geistesgeschichtliche Bewegung," which in retrospect can 
in part be explained by the fact that the period which I studied and tried 
to interpret has its roots in philosophy and thought. As Haym stated in 
his "Einleitung," 
Immer haben seit dem Beginn unsrer gropen Literaturepoche in Deutschland 
Dichtung und Philosophie zusammen gearbeitet und lebhaft ineinandergegriffen. 
Niemals jedoch haben sie sich dergestalt durchdrungen wie in den Bestrebungen 
der Griinder der Romantischen Schule. Je flacher die Wurzeln sind, welche die 
Dichtung dieser Zeit im Boden des Lebens, die Philosophie im Boden des Realen 
hatte, um so mehr verschlingen diese beiden ihre Wurzeln ineinander und 
suchen eine aus der anderen Nahrung zu ziehen. In  dieser aupersten Geistigkeit, 
in dem Ineinanderflieflen des Phantasie- und Gedankenlebens besteht geradezu, 
wenn es doch einmal unter eine Formel gebracht werden soll, das Wesen der 
Romantik . . . (Die romantische Sckale [3rd ed; Berlin, 19141, pp. 7-8). 
I will have occasion later to discuss several modem works on Romanticism 
which are indebted to the spirit of "Geistesgeschichte." It can perhaps be 
said with some justification that Goethe is the patron of Positivism under 
the formula "Leben und Werk sind eins," and Schiller the father of 
"Geistesgeschichte" under the rule "Geist und Kunst sind verbunden." 
Two recent schools of interpretation, very cIoseIy related to each other, 
have made a serious attempt at replacing "Geistesgeschichte" in the last 
thirty years or so. I am referring to "Literatunvissenschaft" and its Anglo- 
American equivalent, the "New Criticism." Perhaps it is too early and 
therefore not quite fair to draw conclusions, but it seems that the first- 
named movement has as yet not lived up to its promise which, in more re- 
cent years, has been to subject "Schone Literatur" and "Poetik" to close and 
single-minded ~crutiny.~ The leading spokesmen of the group, Emil Staiger 
and the Iate Wolfgang Kayser, have written brilliantly executed expository 
pieces, treating general as well as specific poetic and philosophica1 themes, 
comparing and analyzing individual poems, and drawing "essential char- 
acterizations" of poets, just as Friedrich Schlegel did. But they have shied 
away from any sustained historical investigation of more than one author- 
Staiger's Goethevs a case in point-and I am inclined to think that simply 
on the basis of their program we cannot expect much from "Literatur- 
wissenschaft" in the area of extended literary history, particularly in the 
field of Romanticism. I greatly fear that, if the "Literaturwissenschaftler" 
were ever to investigate the authors of the so-called "Friihromantik," they 
would simply cast them out, as has been done by the ''Geistesgeschichtler~' 
Ben .  and Ruprecht, and probably for similar reasons: Jena's obvious 
intellectuality and, excepting Novalis and young Brentano, its lack of 
artistic creativity. 
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New Criticism, as we all know, has almost run its course. It was overly 
concerned with the work alone, with problems of structure and "pure" 
poetics; yet the practice of the New Critics has been shown not to be as 
pure as they had assumed. Theirs was an ideal which did not take into 
account the human weakness of the interpreter, his memory of extrinsic 
facts, and the consideration that, whether we like it or not, life and art, 
reality and illusion, or fact and fiction are intimately related. Author and 
work may not be one, but the one is impossible without the other and our 
knowledge and understanding of the latter is impoverished if we deal with 
it only in a vacuum - provided, of course, that we still intend to hold 
fast to the foremost of our humanistic ideals, the claim towards univer- 
sality. As far as our period is concerned, the New Critics could do little 
with it or for it, remaining hostile to what they considered the Romantics' 
wild, humorless, and unsophisticated ~t ra ins .~  T. S. Eliot, whose early 
negative attitude to Goethe is well-known until he delivered the "Hamburg 
Lecture," could say blatantly, "there may be a good deal to be said for 
Romanticism in life, there is no place for it in  letter^."^ The New Critics 
were in the main content with ready-made negative "metaphysical" defini- 
tions in viewing Romanticism. 
We have, it seems to me, reached a rather hazardous and painful period 
in the history of "Literaturgeschichte," which I take to be the basic, 
central, and unifying study in our discipline excluding, of course, linguistics 
and "non-literary" philology. This unhappy situation is compounded by 
the fact that we are not alone in facing a crisis, but that all around us, 
wherever we look, be it at any of the other branches of learning, even at 
our sister discipline, philology, at the contemporary arts, the natural 
sciences, or at politics and society, we find the same aimlessness and sense 
of loss of direction that we are experiencing. No historian of German 
literature can miss the point that with materialism and rationalism rampant, 
with Existentialism or, shall we say, scepticism flourishing, we are reliving 
vicariously the late eighteenth century. 
The question, where literary history is going, whether it ought to 
renounce its claim toward the comprehension of the totality and order of 
literary phenomena, toward a rational, methodical, and critical evaluation 
of poetry in the context of prior and later developments on the basis of 
style, form, and symbol and in connection with the entire intellectual 
tradition, with the life and surroundings of the poet, his times, his friends; 
or whether literary history should subscribe to no principles at all and 
leave everything to inspiration and chance, concentrating instead on 
subjective and atomistic portrayal, turning out poetry on poetry, specu- 
lating on myths and archetypes-these are problems that are very much 
with us. I have no pat solution, although I have faith in an ideal of 
"Literaturgeschichte" where we will no longer claim baldly that literature 
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is just philosophical knowledge translated into imagery and verse, but 
where we will hold that poetry also expresses an intellectual attitude to 
life, as Rudolf Unger suggested more than once.s This would certainly 
encompass also the history of poetics, of structure, of genres and of the 
entire intellectual background of the period under discussion. My ideal 
literary history, however, will pay little attention to the lives of the poets 
or to the socio-political situation of their times, unIess absolutely necessary 
for an understanding of their work which must become the center of 
attention, the "Ausgangspunkt" for our study. If this is eclecticism, I 
frankly confess to it, as also to my debt of gratitude to "Literatunvissen- 
schaft" and New Criticism. Major movements such as these do not disap- 
pear without casting a long shadow into the uncharted f u t ~ r e . ~  
As historians of literature we must be constantly aware of two funda- 
mental truths: first, art is basically irrational, and second, our discipline 
cannot afford but be rational, So while our logic may never exhaust or 
even discover the essence of poetry, we must continue the tradition of the 
Grand Illusion, as do all men who live dedicated to a noble cause. Indeed, 
the true appreciation of literature is subjective and individualistic-and 
the giants who preceded us, such as Dilthey and Scherer, fully realized 
this-for "ars longa, vita brevis est"; but let us take heart from Haym's 
proud though pessimistic statement, "Stuckwerk ist und bleibt eben jede 
historische Darstel l~ng."~~ 
Speaking specifically, the kind of literary history of our period which 
I visualize will have to get rid of certain basic premises mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper. They are two in number and, in my opinion, their 
widespread acceptance has had disastrous consequences in the treatment 
of the Romantic movement. Because they are closely related and generally 
appear together they may be treated as one: the principle of polarity, i.e. 
thesis and antithesis, and the principle of higher union of these, i.e. 
synthesis. 
When we look at the chaos of fact and fiction before us, which we name 
"life," and view it conscious of the passing of time and in relation to 
ourselves and others of the human race on earth (and soon perhaps in 
outer space), which we designate as "history," we have already imposed 
a certain pattern on the former, which we call "law" or "principle of 
history." This principle may be largely of a religious nature, it may be 
based on philosophical speculation, or on the observation of natural facts. 
The Orient's "law of history" was symbolized by the snake holding its tail 
in its fangs-eternal repetition. Heraclitus apparently saw it in the river's 
swiftly flowing waters-eternal change. Darwin perceived it in Nature's 
bitter warfare-natural selection from accidental variations. Most Western 
historians ever since Kant, the Romantics, and Hegel have applied one 
absolute principle to the historical process: the law of dialectics, a trans- 
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cendental-idealistic construct. Hofmannsthal restated Hegel's famous for- 
mulation of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis, when he said poetically, 
"Jede Entwicklung bewegt sich in der SchraubenIinie, laszt nichts vollig 
hinter sich, kehrt in hohem Gewinde zum gleichen Punkt zuriick."'l We 
are a11 familiar with Comte's three stages of progress and with Spengler's 
pessimistic as well as Toynbee's more recent optimistic use of this principle. 
I t  must be realized, however, that this so-called "law of dialectics" is 
purely normative and regulative, derived from a particular philosophical 
view prevalent and widely accepted at one time in our past. It is not 
sacrosanct as such. One can certainly conceive the idea that at another 
time in our history a different historical theory could be evolved more in 
keeping with the aspirations and views of that age. We only have to think 
of Herder's organic law seen under the metaphor of a tree, or of the 
Church's otherworldly scheme symbolized by the Cross. 
I t  is my belief that we have arrived at a time when we must discard the 
dialectic law. While I am experiencing difficulties in finding good rationaI 
reasons in support of this belief, although I tried several minutes ago to 
draw a picture of the spiritual unrest of our age, and while I am equally 
hard put to suggest a balanced principle to take its place, I am fairly 
confident that I can prove to you in the case of recent Romantic scholarship 
why this superimposed law which has become the basic assumption of 
German Iiterary history (not to mention Marxism) is totally wrong. The 
dialectic principle is the red thread that can be traced, now appearing, now 
disappearing, in all of the works on German Romanticism in the last 
one hundred fifty years. 
Sydney Hook, in his Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy (New York, 
1940), has already stated the logical argument against the dialectic system. 
Jacques Barzun, in his Darwin, Marx, Wagner: Critique of a Heritage 
(1941) ,I2 apparently misunderstood Professor Hook's intention, which was 
not at all to set up seven dialectic features, but to disprove them. Dean 
Barzun believes that there is a "sound core of the idea," employing rather 
impressionistic language to make his point. But not being a logician, I 
shall have to advance a different argument. I will stake my case 1 )  on the 
present appalling confusion of terminology and thought concerning the 
literature of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 2) on the 
many retractions of previous definitions proposed by the most eminent 
scholars in the field of Romanticism, 3) on the erroneous use of the 
principle of polarity, and 4) on the unwarranted value judgments concern- 
ing the periodization of that literature. Points three and four go to the 
heart of the dialectic system. This discussion, while still hoping to continue 
the task of examining significant contributions to German Romantic 
scholarship since Schultz's paper of 1950, will in the main restrict itself 
to a brief appraisal of four distinctive views exemplified by the work of 
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Arthur 0. Lovejoy, Ren6 Wellek, Hermann A. Korff, and Erich Ruprecht. 
The issues may at times overlap, as is only to be expected. 
In  looking at the scholarship of German Romanticism, we are faced with 
utter and unbelievable chaos. As early as 1830 Goethe, referring to the con- 
cept of classical and romantic poetry (which he claimed he and Schiller 
had invented whereas it was Hurd and Warton), stated engagingly to 
Eckermann that it "jetzt iiber die ganze Welt geht und so vie1 Streit und 
Spaltungen verursacht" (March 21). No other period in our literature is 
in a similar state of confused and confusing analyses, and most scholars 
shy away from general discussions, preferring to concentrate their energies 
on severely limited enquiries. There are literally thousands of definitions 
of Romanticism and, I am sure, each one of us has his pet theory which, 
I warrant, is unique. Ernest Bembaum, in his Guide Through the Romantic 
Movement (1930),13 has given us a sketchy list of the many contradictory 
definitions of the term "Romanticism" (from Goethe and Heine to Brune- 
tiire and Saintsbury) and of its suggested founders (from Homer, Christ and 
Plato to Rousseau and Kant, not even bothering to include Wacltenroder, 
Friedrich Schlegel or Novalis). We only have to look at the multiplicity 
of definitions made use of in the published reports of the last Tiibingen 
symposium of 194814 or in the Prentice-Hall paper-back edition of essays 
of 196215 to realize the terrible predicament in which the serious student 
of the period finds himself. 
Admittedly the concept of 'Xomanticism" and the adjective LcRomantic" 
from which it developed are loaded terms.lG These words have been emptied 
of a precise meaning because of their peculiar origin, history, and applica- 
tion. When Novalis says that "die Kunst, auf eine angenehme Art zu 
befremden, einen Gegenstand fremd zu machen und doch bekannt und 
anziehend" is "romantische Poesie," or when he advances his famous defini- 
tion, "Romantisieren ist nichts als eine qualitative Potenzierung . . . indem 
ich dem Gemeinen einen hohen Sinn, dem Gewohnlichen ein geheimnis- 
volles Ansehen, dem Bekannten die Wiirde des Unbekannten, dem End- 
lichen einen unendlichen Sinn gebe, so romantisiere ich es"-not to 
speak of Friedrich Schlegel's " 1 16. Athenaumsfragment"-we may con- 
sider these statements as expressing a) a program for a new literature or a 
new Literary movement, b )  definitions of a type of literature, universally 
accepted and written either in the past, present, or future, in opposition to 
"classical" poetry, c) psycho-aesthetic observations embracing all of poetry, 
or d) remarks developed from close scrutiny of one genre, the epic. You 
can see the problem that arises when a history is written simply on the 
basis of such-we must in all honesty agree with hostile critics of the move- 
ment-nebulous statements. One cannot realIy be surprised, looking at i t  
from this "linguistic" approach, that all the "Friihromantiker" sooner or  
later gave up the use of the term "romantisch," which they themselves had 
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so freely used in the Athenaurn, and, if we really insist on carrying this 
view to a ludicrous extreme, denied ever having belonged to the new school. 
But my argument is not with the Romantics, whom I cherish, but with 
their historians, be they friend or foe. 
It  is my contention that most scholars using the term "romantisch" fall 
into the error of not distinguishing clearly between theories, definitions, and 
views that go under that label and the new movement itself. Confusion 
spreads where confusion has existed to start with, unless one proceeds by 
differentiating clearly between a definitely established, chronologically 
demonstrable movement called "Romantic" and the many meanings which 
the adjective not derived from this one and only allowable source carries. 
My anti-dialectic argument is that the present confusion is aided and 
abetted by the indiscriminate use of the word "Romantic" based primarily 
on an unhistorical, in fact, on a "metaphysical" definition derived from 
the antithetical predilection and, if you will, universal leanings of past 
historians, Friedrich Schiller and Schlegel included. Romanticism is hardly 
at fault, as Irving Babbitt argued so stubbornly; rather is the chaos due to 
scholars such as he who, blindly accepting "Romantic" idiosyncracies, have 
posited two types of personalities and of literatures, and have thus stirred 
up the witches' brew which has become our daily poison. 
This sad situation has caused many historians of Romanticism agonizing 
moments of despair and has given rise to serious doubts as to the wisdom 
of employing the concepts "Romanticism" and "Romantic" further. I t  is 
not surprising to discover that "Geistesgeschichtler," in particular, have 
from time to time advocated that we drop the terms entirely. Dilthey was 
first when he, still somewhat facetiousIy I believe, suggested "dap man sich 
seiner [i.e., der Romantik] entledigt" because of the "Mipbrauch" with 
the movement's name.17 He was echoed by Schultz who requested seriously 
that the concepts be avoided, if at all possible, or at least that their use be 
limited severely.18 
The same plea was made in this country by the late Professor Lovejoy 
of the History of Ideas movement in a now famous address before the 
Modern Language Association in 1923 entitled "On the Discrimination of 
R o m a n t i ~ i s n s . " ~ ~ n  the paper he presented four explicit alternatives to 
correct the dangerous confusion of terminology which he called "the scandal 
of literary history and criticism." The first is Dilthey's earlier suggestion, 
"that we should all cease talking about Romanticism"; the second is 
Schultz7s idea expressed succinctly to the effect that scholars and critics 
be prevailed upon to "restrict their use of the term to a single and 
reasonably well-defined sense." Both these proposals are discarded as soon 
as stated for being impracticable. The third alternative requires the appli- 
cation of Lovejoy's method, the tracing of the unit-idea "Romantic" from 
its inception onward. The fourth is the result of this technique: that we use 
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the concept "Romanticism" in the plural, not only as applied to European 
literature as a whole, but even in the case of the literature of one country. 
It  must be stated that Lovejoy undertook to prove only that Joseph 
Warton's poem "The Enthusiast" of 1740, F. Schlegel's conception of 
"romantische Poesie" of 1796, and the personality of Chateaubriand before 
1799 and after, have almost nothing in common, though usually all three 
phenomena are called "Romantic." He did not demonstrate, as he claimed, 
his "recognition of a prima jacie plurality of Romanticisms, of possibly 
quite distinct thought-complexes, a number of which may appear in one 
country" ("On the Discrimination of Romanticisms," pp. 234-235), 
although I would agree with him to a certain extent, as I shall show later. 
Lovejoy certainly went too far when he summed up, "any attempt at a 
general appraisal even of a single chronologically determinate Romanticism 
-still more of 'Romanticism' as a whole-is a fatuity" (p. 252). The error 
which Lovejoy commits is obvious: his argument rests on popular 
misconceptions about the word "Romantic." When he then traces the 
development of this term and applies it to a poem, a set of theories, and a 
person, all of then. labelled "Romantic," he naturally finds that the concept 
makes no sense. He has failed to convince us because he started out at the 
wrong end. As I mentioned before, one must begin with a proper historical 
definition of the movement "Romanticism" and then proceed towards ex- 
plaining the adjective. I should like to add that Julius Petersen reached 
almost the same conclusions as Lovejoy on the basis of some highly 
questionable metaphysical (Hegelian) deductions. He "asserted that it is 
impossible to reduce the spirit of romanticism to a pure formula, because 
that does violence to one of its principal characteristics (namely eternal 
becoming) ."20 
Professor Lovejoy's last two proposals occasioned a spirited response by 
RenC Wellek twenty-five years later when the paper appeared in book 
form. I am referring to Professor Wellek's well-known essay "The Concept 
of 'Romanticism' in Literary History" in Volume I of Comparative Litera- 
t ~ r e . ~ ~  In it he superbly defends the continued use of the period term 
"Romanticism" and makes a cogent case for the view that there is a unified 
European Romantic movement. Time does not permit going into detail, 
though no Germanist, to my knowledge, has ever replied to Wellek's sweep- 
ing statements on German Romanticism. They were occasioned by Love- 
joy's extreme stand on no unity whatsoever which forced the respondent 
into a similarly extreme position and to overstate the case for Comparative 
Literature. 
Wellek discovers the unity of Romanticism in "the same conceptions of 
poetry and of the workings and nature of poetic imagination, the same con- 
ception of nature and its relation to man, and basically the same poetic 
style, with a use of imagery, symbolism, and myth which is clearly distinct 
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from that of the eighteenth-century neoclassicism" (p. 147). He makes 
German literature his test case and finds that there is a unity and coherence 
based on the abovementioned criteria "between the date of Klopstock's 
Messiah (1748) and the death of Goethe.'' He cannot accept the view 
"that romanticism is the creation of the Schlegels, Tieck, Novalis, and 
Wackenroder." To him these eighty-four years represent a movement which 
"in European terms, would have to be called 'romantic' " (p. 147). In 
discussing Goethe, Wellek claims him for Romanticism chiefly because his 
"greatest works are the subjective lyrics, Faust, the very influential Meister, 
and, of course, Werther" (p. 148). The new view of this period, according 
to Wellek, "is a revival of Neoplatonism, a pantheism (whatever its con- 
cessions to orthodoxy), a monism which arrived at identification of God 
and the world, soul and body, subject and object'' (p. 150). The enthusiasm 
for Greece shown by Schiller, Humboldt, Goethe, Holderlin, and the early 
Friedrich Schlegel are proof to him of what he calls "romantic Hellenism," 
provided the "view that a large part of Hellenism is romantic is justified" 
(pp. 148 ff.) . 
Let me state first that I have a great deal of sympathy for Professor 
Wellek's argument in favor of a unified European Romantic movement. 
We are all familiar with George Santayana's treatment of Gothe's Faust 
as exemplifying the Romantic ~pirit.~"ritz Strich remarked, "die lclassische 
Dichtung Goethes und Schillers . . . wurde vom AusIand ganz als Romantik 
empfunden . . . ," and if one talks "von der weltliterarischen Wirkung der 
deutschen Dichtung . . . , kann man zwischen Klassik und Romantik keinen 
Unterschied ma~hen."~3 We must keep this in mind. On the other hand, 
we cannot entirely accept Eudo C. Mason's implied thesis that there is 
hardly any worthwhile English Romantic movement if compared to the 
achievement of German Romanticism, and that German Romanticism is a 
poor thing anyway compared to the achievement of Goethe and S ~ h i l l e r . ~ ~  
Professor Mason relies almost entirely on Crabb Robinson's eye-witness 
reports which demonstrate indeed that the English poets learned little 
from their German contemporaries and vice versa. 
Apart from this, Wellek's case does not stand up too well even if we 
could accept his definitions of Romanticism, which we cannot do in good 
conscience. We simply know too much about the individual style, views, 
and lives of the poets concerned to be able to agree with his sweeping 
generalizations. He oversimplifies the case, and where Lovejoy failed to 
see the forest because of the trees, Wellek fails to see the trees because of 
the forest. We face here a typical case of high-level abstractions which 
have become meaningless in the sense that, if we generalize far enough, we 
shall reach a point where all views are the same. As it is, we can pick out 
any statement made by Wellek and show that it does not apply to all the 
poets mentioned. Take, for instance, the idea of pantheism: this might 
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be found in the early Goethe and, as Wellek calls him, in "an extremely 
irrationalistic preromantic" Herder (p. 148), both of whom are not sys- 
tematic philosophers by any means, but is it displayed in the writings of 
Schiller, particularly after he had fallen under the spell of Kant, for 
whom the additional issue 01 "monism" never presented a problem because 
of the fundamental dualistic orientation of "Vernunftphilosophie"? Pro- 
fessor Wellek argues against nominalism, but he himself, as in the case of 
Herder, makes plentiful use of it. We can agree, however, with part of his 
"Hellenistic" argument: Winckelmann, in our view too, no longer represents 
pure Neo-Classicism. His view of Greece is certainly that of a new era, 
though I could not in good conscience call it "Romantic." Friedrich 
Schlegel's discovery of chthonian elementary forces in Greek mythology 
are a far cry from the statuesque serenity so urgentIy desired by the restless 
spirits of Winclcelmann, Goethe, and Schiller. 
However, there is no need for us to proceed with a detailed criticism of 
Professor Wellek's argument. Morse Peckham has come to the aid of 
Lovejoy, in an article entitled "Toward a Theory of R~manticism,"~"y 
trying to reconcile the views of the later Lovejoy with those of his critic. 
He revises Wellek's definition of Romanticism as being contained in Love- 
joy's short formula of 1941: "organicism, dynamism, and diversitarian- 
As I have stated before, we must reject oversimplifications of this 
sort, for this brief slogan wouId embrace the entire modern history 01 ideas 
starting with Paracelsus, Giordano Bruno, and Jakob Bohme, but saying 
very little about literature. Professor Peckham proceeds to argue the case 
for a European Romanticism. I,  too, hold to the idea of a European 
Romantic movement, but I severely restrict the use of the term "Romanti- 
cism" to one particular group of writers, namely those authors who called 
themselves or who allowed themselves to be called Romantics. I t  is an 
historically evolved term for a "school" of writers who were conscious of 
their opposition to previous or contemporary literary associations, styles, 
and manners, exemplified in Germany, for instance, by the circles in Jena, 
Heidelberg, Berlin, and T i i b i n g e ~ ~ . ~ ~  I see no other way to bring order out 
of chaos. 
Let me now return to to my main argument against dialectics. Almost all 
of the scholars here mentioned have changed their views and definitions 
at a Iater stage of their careers. Dilthey, as we have seen, did not take 
seriously his own suggestion to discard the concept of Romanticism. Schultz 
in his later publications, particularly his Klassik und Ramantik der Deut- 
s ~ h e n , 3 ~  employs the two terms on almost every page with the most con- 
fusing de- and connotations. Lovejoy, as was stated before, changed his 
deeply pessimistic views on the plurality of Romanticisms in favor of a 
unified philosophical movement. He realized, we may assume, that he could 
not operate with a definition derived from the many meanings of the 
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adjective. Wellek, for all practical purposes, retreated too from his earlier 
unified position. In the first volume of his monumental A History of  Mod- 
ern Criticism: 1750-1950, he describes Goethe as keeping "his hold on the 
essentials of clas~icism."~~chil ler  is seen as the critic who "sums up and 
salvages the heritage of the 18th century and yet is the wellspring of 
romantic cr i t i~ ism."~~ Although it may be argued that theory may differ 
from practice, this is not Wellek's argument, and we are under no obliga- 
tion to make allowances here for this unlikely hypothesis. The new "villain" 
for Lovejoy, as Peckham pointed out (though this is not his term and in- 
tent; cf. "Theory of Romanticism" in Romanticism, pp. 214 ff.), is "static 
mechanism," for Wellek it is "Neo-Classicism." In other words, Romanti- 
cism is the antithesis to these two abstractions which allegedly contain the 
essence of the preceding period. We are face to face with dialectics and 
with confusing recantations inherent in the system and fostered by it. It is 
interesting to note that Peckham also revised his opinion on some par- 
ticulars in a later essay: Romanticism seems to have become Enlighten- 
ment, as Professor WelIek remarks.31 
The next two points are closely related. The principle of polarity, the 
"heart" of the system, was developed in the era of Idealism and Romanti- 
cism. Schiiler's essay "Uber naive und sentimentalische Dichtung" (1795- 
96) is, I think, the first profound attempt to contrast two types of poets and 
their works anthropologically, although the vague beginnings of such a 
literary contradistinction can be traced back to various late eighteenth- 
century English and German Storm aod Stress critics. Friedrich Schlegel's 
"Studium-Aufsatz," which precedes Schiller's formulation by one year, is 
another such an antithetical contribution which contrasts "classical" with 
LLm~dern'7 or ' L ~ h a r a ~ t e r i ~ t i ~ 7 '  li eratures and authors. "Geistesgeschichte," 
in particular, fastened on this convenient method of classification, develop- 
ing certain metaphysical-ontological typologies of poets and entire litera- 
tures. This highly questionable method of grouping together works and 
authors, and particulars and universals, led Dilthey to establish his three 
types of Weltanschauung as exemplified by thinkers and poets, Herman 
Noh1 to apply these to the arts of painting and music, and Oskar WalzeI to 
fit these to authors of nineteenth-century German literature. 
These constructs have played havoc with a sane, immanently developed, 
and historically sound and specific view of art and literature. The epoch 
which produced these verbal condensations should properly be called Neo- 
Scholasticism and its fallacious argument is best illustrated by Fritz Strich's 
Deutsche Klassik und Romantik. Strich's normative "Grundbegriffe," de- 
rived from V~olfflin7s categories, are too well-known to require discussion 
here. Walther Linden, in his otherwise objectionable article "Umwertung 
der Rornantik7"3%ightly pointed out that Strich contrasts the views of the 
later Goethe and SchiJler with those of the early Romantics, or, in other 
GERMAN ROMANTICISM 15 
words, twenty-five years of "Classicism" with two or three years of "Ro- 
manticism." In addition, Strich carefully selected his evidence to favor his 
antithetical argument. 
The greatest work on Romanticism after Haym is H. A. Korff7s monu- 
mental four-volume history Geist der Goethezeit: Versuch einer ideellen 
Entwicklung der Klassisch-Roma~tischen Literaturgeschichte (Leipzig, 
1923 ff.). Much has been said in praise of it; both Petersen and Korner 
regarded the volumes which they reviewed as the last word on our period. 
I agree with these opinions in many ways, but I wish to demonstrate that 
the work's over-all view, based as it is on the dialectic principle, does 
injustice to the poets and the literature concerned. To be brief: a praise- 
worthy L'geistesgeschichtliche" attempt is made (following a suggestion of 
Scherer's), to see the entire era as one, as is indicated by the title of the 
history, but this attempt is not really successful. In actual practice Korff 
uses the Hegelian antinomy by introducing Dilthey7s concept of changing 
generations. The spirit of the age of Goethe develops through three genera- 
tions: the first one is the Storm and Stress-Classical group, which is seen as 
oriented towards humanism; the second one is the "Friihromantik," which 
is engaged in the "Romantisierung" or poetization of this humanism; and 
the third one is the "Hochromantik," which takes for granted what its 
immediate predecessors had discovered: Religion and the Christian Middle 
Ages. The first two volumes are largely philosophical treatises on the 
thought of Storm and Stress and of "Classicism," referring from time to 
time to irrationalism (i.e., Storm and Stress), to rationalism (i.e., Classi- 
cism), and to the synthesis of these two (i.e., Romanticism). The two last 
volumes are splendid analytical studies of individual authors, shying away, 
on the whole (as do the first two volumes), from the customary dichotomies 
of "cla~sical'~ and "romantic." But the whole work is based on the prin- 
ciple of Hegelian synthetic advances in three or four stages. A valiant at- 
tempt is made to find a niche for Jean Paul, Kleist, Nolderlin, and E. Th. A. 
Hoffmann who, in other histories, because of the usual straight-jacket 
method of the dichotomy, were conveniently forgotten. We must suspect 
that the last two volumes are superior because the literary works themselves 
zre discussed, reference to high-level abstractions are absent, and the 
dialectic law is rarely invoked by name. That, however, explains also why 
these last volumes do not fit into the scheme that Korff had originally 
planned. They stand by themselves, the authors of the later period seem no 
longer enmeshed in some compulsory super-imposed heavily drawn graph. 
My fourth task is to show how value-judgments derived from Hegelian 
dialectics are worthless and even dangerous in the periodization of litera- 
ture. The label "Deutsche Bewegung," given by some scholars to Romanti- 
cism in Germany, is an obnoxious and historically questionable name. It 
could only arise at a time when a nationally oriented "Geistesgeschichte" 
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fastened on the political aspects of the Romantic era. Scholars like Noh1 
and Richard Benz coined the term, Schultz took it over, and the last one 
to make much of it is Erich Ruprecht in his Der Azlfbruch der romantischen 
Bewegung (Miinchen, 1948). Because he disagrees violently with Korff's 
opinion that the Romantic movement is greatly indebted to Weimar, 
Ruprecht, like Benz in Die deutsche Rornantilc (Leipzig, 1937), proposes 
to give up the "Friihromantik" in order to save the "Hochromantik." To 
him only Wackenroder and the later Romantics are the true representatives 
of Romanticism. By way of Nietzsche he associates them with Mamann 
and Herder. He makes much of Wackenroder's "Unmittelbarkeit eines 
beseeligenden Erfahrens" and pits this against the early Romantics' 
"Erkenntnis" (Der Aufbruch der romantischen Bewegung, p, 431). There 
is also, Ruprecht insists, a difference between the striving for the MiddIe 
Ages, for a religious experience, and that immediate and spontaneous 
emotion which the genuine Romantic, the "Hochromantiker," experiences 
and lives (p. 37). Late Romanticism is equated with the dionysian spirit, 
as if SchilIer, Coethe, Friedrich Schlegel, Creuzer and Gorses had no 
knowledge of that realm! 
A vague "Volkstum" represents to Ruprecht the original discovery of 
Romanticism (p. 20), a concept, by the way, which has been disavowed 
by leading historians since R a ~ ~ k e . ~ ~  Heidelberg is identified with "Miissen," 
Jena with "Wollen"; the latter, therefore, must be bypassed and sacrificed 
(p. 40). Statements such as "Heidelbergs Reichtum beruht in der einfachen, 
aber unmittelbaren Erfahrung des Wirltend-Wirklichen" (p. 49) and "Der 
Idealist jeder Form," referring to lena, "steht immer vor dem Abgrund 
des Selbstuntergangs, den er meidet, wenn er ihn auch mit seiner Begriffs- 
spekulation bestandig uberfliegt" (pp. 40-41), show clearly where Ruprecht 
stands: one can even imagine the crashing chords of Wagnerian music in 
the background. Whereas Ricarda Huch had shown Jena to be the 
"Bliitezeit" and Heidelberg the "Verfall," here we witness the opposite. 
The whole nonsensical argument rests on the fallacious assumption that 
one Romantic group alone represents the true spirit of the entire move- 
ment and that one school is superior to the other. This is the result of 
our heritage, the dialectic law which demands that we give value judgments 
since the thesis and antithesis merge in a higher synthesis, on and on, 
until we are face to face with the Absolute. This idealistic technique of 
climbing Jacob's ladder, Hegel's historical process, has almost ruined our 
view of Romanticism. 
This sad situation in our scholarship is compounded by indiscriminate 
borrowing and admixing from often incidental and widely separate contri- 
butions to the field for fear of leaving anything unsaid. Schultz's history 
is a splendid example for this olla podrida, where side by side we find 
references to the "Deutsche Bewegung" (though even he calls one of 
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Benz's books "verworren," Klassik und Romantik, I, 263), to the hack- 
neyed polarities, the racial-biological theories of Nadler, anything that can 
in any way be identified as deserving the label "Romantic." Yet he failed 
in carrying his study forward to the 'twenties and 'thirties of the last cen- 
tury! Plagiarizing is not uncommon, and one encounters Haym in Schultz, 
Strich in Korff, Benz in Ruprecht, etc. German Romantic scholarship is, 
indeed, in a sorry plight. 
My conclusion must be short. The absolute chaos that we are witnessing 
today in the scholarship of German Romanticism is intimately connected 
with the supreme rule of the dialectic principle. It is time that we get rid 
of it, for it oversimplifies and falsifies our history. The term "Romanticism" 
is an eminently suitable period term and should only be used as such; the 
same applies to the adjective "Romantic." Although I find myself in 
sympathy with Professor Wellek's suggestion that we call the entire German 
period from 1748 to 1832 "romantic," it is an unmanageable proposal 
leading to further normative chaos. I am afraid that we Germanists must 
cling to the terms as spanning the period from about 1795 to about 1832. 
These two concepts, according to my definition, can only be applied to 
the new literary "schools" and their authors, flourishing in these approxi- 
mate periods, be they situated in Germany, France, or England. There 
can be no doubt that Winckelmann, Herder, Goethe, and Schiller held 
many views in common with the Schlegels, Hugo, and Coleridge, for 
instance, and that their work even gave rise to many of the practices and 
views of these later and sometimes contemporary authors. But they are 
not to be called "romantic," since they themselves objected to, or w d d  
have protested against, that 
Here I see that, after all, I must offer you my own definition of Roman- 
ticism which, I realize only too well, is still heavily indebted to "Geistes- 
geschichte." I would not fasten on historical themes and religious motifs, 
as Korff did, for that kind of definition would not include outsiders, like 
Kleist, Holderlin, and Hoffmann; and Storm and Stress also treated the 
Christian Middle Ages. The question that we must ask is not, what did 
the older poets and the new poets have in common, but what is the new 
view that the latter held and how is it demonstrated in their language? 
To me the answer is obvious. They maintained that Nature and the Human 
Spirit are divorced, that these two realms can be joined only through a 
determined creative act of the individual (or, in older times, of a group of 
individuals). This act can be aesthetic, religious, philosophical, even 
erotic. This view, because of the poets' histories, emphasizes worldly 
experience in the beginning; later it tends to stress otherworldly aspects. 
Novalis' veil before the goddess at Sais, as well as Tieck's and Hoffmann's 
demonic Nature, Kleist's marionettes and Holderlids suicide of Empe- 
dokles, are symptomatic of this dualistic Weltanschauung. To my mind, 
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Tiibingen gave up this position, fleeing into an idyllic past where the 
danger is largely resolved through an illusory and assumed naivete. The 
middle SchiIler is closest to the Romantic view, though he came from the 
stern treatment of pathetic ideas and advanced to that of fatalistic history. 
The Romantics, on the whole, dealt with lyrical situations before a back- 
drop of playful though sincere metaphysics and religion. Theirs is the last 
attempt in our literature to explain the world as a conscious creative act: 
a "rational" method directed towards an "idealist-aesthetic-mystic" union. 
My qualified definition of Romanticism thus takes full cognizance of 
the fact that the Romantics themselves believed in the dialectic dualism 
and its progression. Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel, Novalis, 
Arnim, young Brentano and Eichendorff, and Holderlin had faith in the 
ultimate synthesis of the polarity and felt themselves to be part, of the 
divine cosmic scheme of dialectic rhythm. They popularized this view, 
and literary history was at fault for adopting it. 
As I have attempted to show, the fallacy of literary history has been its 
blind acceptance of the Romantic dialectic vision as a metaphysical truth 
and as a basis for valid and accurate historical description. But literary 
history cannot be a spiral progression because many more than three 
dimensions are involved and because both the directions and the dimen- 
sions change as history goes on. The historians we have discussed tried to 
make literature and/or culture a matter of only three, at times of only 
two dimensions. That is the reason why ultimately I am not satisfied with 
my own "over-generalizing" definition of Romanticism, although, I am 
inclined to believe, it is accurate enough on the basis of the philosophical 
leanings of the authors involved. The view which I advocate is not "uni- 
tarian," it is, if a label must be found, "multiplicitarian." At issue is the 
age-old controversy between historians and logicians, between relativists 
and absolutists. Obviously, I side with the former. I would, indeed, have 
felt far less exposed if I could simply have offered definitions of Weimar, 
Jena, Heidelberg, Berlin, and Tiibingen. 
One more word about the principle which I visualize in history. I do not 
advocate a return to Herder's view (which is failing us also because of 
his inadequate treatment of modem times in the Ideen), for I do not share 
his basic optimism. The view of life and history which I suggest is largely 
pessimistic. To my mind, knowledge is never final, never absolute, though 
reality is both. I do perceive "Spriinge und Risse," I see parallels and 
reversions, sudden skips and schisms. Life, history, and literature have no 
convenient order and arrangement, they do not move in binomial contrasts 
and dualistic opposition. And may I remind you of the fact that during 
the height of our Golden Age in German letters, popular authors, such as 
August Lafontaine and August von Kotzebue, ruled supreme. Should they 
not be taken into account in our literary history, even if only to show how 
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much time and energy the Romantics devoted to them in their mutual 
"Tintenkrieg"? Can we indeed legislate a general spirit of a period on the 
basis of a minority sampling, superior though it is? 
The law operating in history is not without, it must be derived from 
within. Like Heraclitus, I[ would call it motion, though my symbol for it 
is the Sea: ceaseless activity, forward, sideways, and backward, very rarely 
upward. Any historian who makes his own tastes and views the only 
common denominator for the study of literature commits a crime against 
the works in question. The law must be left to the literature itself. There 
is no handsome goal awaiting us yonder, no heavenly promise of infinite 
perfection and final "reality." Any order that the literature possesses, 
particularly in the area of categories and periods, must be derived from it, 
from the views, techniques, and groupings of the authors and their works. 
Literary scholarship cannot afford to be blindly dogmatic if it is to survive 
as a respected discipline. 
APPENDIX 
A Postscript to Josef Korner 
After I had published the article "In Memoriam: Josef Korner (tMay 
1950) ," Modern Language Review, LVIII (1963), 38-59, I received 
several communications which, I believe, should be made public in the 
interest of historical veracity and as a further tribute to this great scholar 
of Romanticism. 
In a letter dated April 8, 1963, Professor Wolfgang Paulsen of the 
University of Connecticut, a close friend of Professor Korner during the 
last years of his life, kindly pointed out to me that I couId have stated the 
urgent need for a revision of the Bibliographisches Handbuch des deutschen 
Schrifttums (3rd ed., Bern, 1949) in my introductory remarks. He felt that 
the publisher ought to have been prodded to keep this book up-to-date. 
In my reply I expressed the opinion that the need was perhaps not this 
great in view of the Eppelsheimer-Kottelwesch volumes and the annual 
PMLA bibliography which bridge the gap from 1948 to the present. 
Dr. Paulsen stated that, if he had known that I was writing on Korner, 
he would have been delighted to make available to me the numerous 
Kijrner letters in his possession. He writes: "You might find in there 
actually more references to projects he had for his old age, and it would 
amuse you perhaps to see that they were quite different from what you 
cuIled from his books. I believe that Korner was just as given to making 
plans and devising projects as his hero, Friedrich Schlegel." 
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The second communication came from the widow of Professor Korner, 
Mrs. Jarmila KornerovCRumlov& of Prague. On the basis of her letter 
(dated May 4, 1963) I wish to modify the statement in which I remarked 
boldly, " 'Der grope Fund' at Coppet during the summer of 1929 could 
not have occurred if Korner had not painstakingly looked and worked for 
it" ("In Memoriam," MLR, p. 40). Mrs. Kornerova writes: 
Ihre Frage, warum sich mein Mann gerade zu dem Fruhromantikstoff hinge- 
zogen fiihlte, habe ich ihm auch gestellt, und er sprach einigemal selbst davon. 
Er bezeichnete die Vertrautheit mit dem Stoff als eine Folge von Schicksals- 
zufSllen. Seine Doktorarbeit war der Anfang, der Coppeter Fund der Gipfel, 
beides zufillig, denn in die Schweiz reiste er als Stipeadist, urn sich im 
Franzosischen zu vervollkommnen. Dazwischen liegt das ganze Werk, von dem 
er sagte, dap er dazu hingezogen wurde. Freilich muate eine WahIvenvandtschaft 
dem Zufall helfen, wie Sie selbst erkannt haben, Dap ihn das judische Element 
in der Friihromantik gelockt hatte, hat er niemals erwahnt. Es mag im Unter- 
bewuptsein liegen, denn erst in den Jahren der Persekution trat es stark in den 
Vordergrund seines Lebens. 
I wish to modify my original remarks by saying that even in the life of 
a scholar that which is accidental can easily turn out to be providential, 
but that it took a detective like Korner to make the most of this discovery. 
Similarly, I stated (on p. 41) that Mrs. Korner sold her husband's 
collection of autographs to make the appearance of the third volume 
possible. Mrs. Korner writes that this was not the case: "Die verkaufte 
aber mein Mann selbst, als wir ohne jedes Einkommen irgendwelche 
Mittel brauchten. Die Briefe waren samtlich bearbeitet, ev. publiziert." 
She also states that she had planned to use the royalties derived from a 
revised edition of the Handbtich for a photo-mechanical reprint of the first 
two volumes of the Krisenjahre. Her search for a bibliographer to under- 
take the task of revising the former failed. "Es ist schade, weil das 
Kommentanverk mit seinen Erl'tiuterungen zu den zum Teil eingestampften 
und fast nicht mehr vorhandenen ersten zwei Briefbanden in der Luft 
htingt. Ein Privatverleger kann solche Kosten kaum tragen. Und wo eine 
Institution finden? Die Verantwortung liegt auf meinem Gewissen." 
The third communication and my reply to it will follow in full. I consider 
the discussion most relevant to an understanding of Professor Korner, his 
motivations, his time and life, and to an understanding of our discipline 
and the men who in the 'twenties and 'thirties were its spokesmen. Scholar- 
ship is not an abstract thriving in a vacuum, it has its roots in the realities 
of historical existence. 
Professor RenC Wellek of Yale University wrote on April 1, 1963: 
I was very pleased to discover your most useful and thorough article on my 
old friend Josef Korner in the recent number of the Modern Language Review, 
January 1963. I think you judged him and his work very well and give an 
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excellent account of his three volumes Krisenjahre der Friihromantik. 
Still, I should like to add something to your comments from my own personal 
knowledge, which may help to explain Korner's possibly excessive preoccupation 
with proving himself an exact traditional scholar. Mr. Korner was as you know 
a Jew who tried to enter the academic profession by becoming a Privatdozent 
at the German University at Prague in 1924. At that time Professor August 
Sauer was the dominating man. He was, I believe, not particularly anti-Semitic. 
Just the other way around, he favored Georg Stefansky, whom he loved like a 
son. But he knew that under the circumstance of the time he could not possibly 
have two Jewish Privatdozenten. He therefore rejected Korner's "Habilitations- 
schrift" Klassiker und Romnntilcer (Berlin, 1924). Korner forced him to publish 
his report in Euphorion, XXVI (1925), pp. 142-150, where you can still read 
this astonishing piece of piddling destructive criticism. Korner answered Sauer's 
incredible attack very effectively in Germanisch-romanische Monatsschrift, 
1926, pp. 304-308, in an "Abwehr" dated April, 1925. Korner's friends in 
Germany were so indignant that they got together a whole roster of distinguished 
professors who signed a protest against Sauer's procedure which expressly 
accused him of injustice and lack of scholarly objectivity, alluding to the fact 
that Sauer's review had very serious practical consequences for Korner. This 
"Erklarung" was signed by F. Briiggemann, E. Castle, C. Enders, P. Kluckhohn, 
H. A. Korff, A. Leitzmann, P. Merker, Leo Spitzer, C. Vietor, 0. Walzel and 
G. Witkowski, and can be found in Literaturblatt fiir Gerwianische und Roma- 
nisclze Philologie, 46 (1925), p. 407. In spite of these protests, nothing could 
be done even by the Czech Ministry of Education, which was very reluctant 
to interfere with the affairs of the German University. 
Sauer died in September, 1926, and his successor Herbert Cysarz began 
lecturing at Prague in October, 1928. Korner renewed his application, and 
Cysarz did not at that time dare to  reject it. But at the colloquium the committee 
consisting of Cysarz, Hauffen and Gierach managed to fail Professor Korner 
by asking him the most fantastically pedantic and out-of-the-way questions. 
I remember clearly to  have heard from Professor Korner himself that he was 
asked the number of copies and their location of the chapbook Till Eulenspiegel, 
the details of the biography of Philipp von Zesen and the plots of obscure 
historical novels by WiIheIm Raabe. This rejection, however, created such a 
stir that the Ministry forced the German University to reopen the question and 
Korner was finally admitted as a Privatdozent in Autumn, 1930. H e  obviously 
had not the slightest chance of promotion. I believe these circumstances are 
very important in accounting for the concentration of Professor Korner's work 
on editing and for the bitterness of some of his polemics. I believe he had other 
ambitions, as you can see from his book on Schnitzler and his very fine articles 
on the theory of tragedy and on the use of the term "motif." 
It is a custom in Germany to sweep such things under the rug. But such an 
explanation seems to me necessary in view of the fact that Herbert Cysarz had 
the astonishing effrontery to publish a malicious, patronizing and patently 
false portrait of Professor Korner in Grenzfall der Wissenschaft: Herbert Cysarz 
(Frankfurt am Main, 1957), pp. 99-101. There he not only denigrated the man 
and scholar, but refers to the flunking of Korner in the Colloquium with 
obvious satisfaction: "Korner nun brachte es zuweg, im Habilitationskollo- 
quium-durchzufallen," as if Cysarz and his friends had not devised the whole 
result beforehand. Cysarz says with obvious glee that Korner never achieved 
a chair, even though he must know that his failure had nothing to do with 
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Komer's qualifications, but was entirely due to the rise of Hitler and the violent 
Nazism of Cysarz and Gierach. I believe that the case of Professor Korner is 
too important a skeleton in the cupboard to be left in the dark. Your fine article 
was the occasion which prompted me to this account of Korner's difficulties. 
In my reply of April 5, 19 63 I wrote: 
Regarding the circumstances surrounding Professor Korner's "Habilitation" 
in Prague, I had heard only vague rumors by younger colleagues and friends 
in Germany last year while composing the review which Dr. Stopp had 
requested. I had, of course, previously read August Sauer's querulous critique 
of Korner's book in Euphorion (ostensibly taking issue with Leitzmann's 
remark, "Korner's ausgezeichnete Schrift," in GRM [Gerrnanisch-romarzische 
Monatsschrift], XI1 [1924], 312). But I found no one who could elaborate. For 
this reason, too, I stressed the later years of Professor Korner's career in what 
turned into a character study and article. 
Your revealing letter makes available biographical information which in part 
helps to explain Korner's later obsession with facts and his growing aggressive- 
ness. I t  also sheds light on a sad page in the history of our discipline. The 
story of ICorner's "Habilitation" is the perfect and sorry example, how the 
accommodation of standards from beyond the pale taints and destroys all and 
everything of value within. Neither the "realist" (Sauer), nor the "victim" 
(Korner) were spared. 
An additional indication of Sauer's partisanship can be found in Euphorion, 
XXV (1925), 302-303 and 713, where he champions in strong terms Stefansky's 
Das Wesen der deutschen Romantik (Stuttgart, 1923) in a "Venvahrung" and 
"Feststellung," respectively, against a critical review of H. A. Korff (Literatur- 
blatt f .  germ. u. rom. Phil., 1924, Nos. 1-3). Korner himself belittled the work 
(in an aside in an article of 1926 which shall be mentioned below) as follows: 
"Was sonst AbschluP und Ernte eines reichen Forscherlebens war, stelIt man 
heut gleich an den Beginn der wissenschaftlichen Laufbahn, zwanzigjahrige 
Jiinglinge deuten und erschlieoen uns schon in ihren Doktorarbeiten die 
'Probleme und Lebensformen von Hamann bis Hegel' [the subtitle of Cysarz' 
first book] oder 'das Wesen der deutschen Romantik' " (p. 455). 
As for the Cysarz-Korner controversy, the development of personal antagon- 
ism between the two men may very well have been caused by Korner 
himself in an article of 1926 entitled "Barocke Barockforschung," Nistorische 
Zeitschrift, CXXXIII, 455-464, which is directed throughout against Cysarz, 
particularly his Deutsche Barockdichturzg. Renaissance-Barock-Rokoko (Leip- 
zig, 1924). Perhaps two lengthy quotations may suffice for the tone and tenor 
of the review which apparently set the stage for the sequel of which your 
letter speaks: 
1.) 
b n  [Cysarz] eignen nlle glrinzenden Gaben-und so ziemlich die meisten Unarten, die seine is 
Wissenschaften und Kunst schopferischen Altersgenossen auszeichnet und kennzeichnet. Gleich mit 
dem Erstlingsbuch "Erfahrung und Idce" (Wien 1921). das ihm den Doktorhut verschaffte, hat ec 
sich in die vordente Reihe der "Geisteshisforiker" eingestcllt und solches Aufsehen erregt, dap ihm 
nicht nur ein ehrenvoller Literaturpreis zufiel, sondern er auch ungeachtet seiner Jugend als ernstcr 
Xandidat bei der Bescfzung cines bedeutenden Lehrstuhls in  Betracht kommen konnte. I n  der Tat 
verrnittelt jenes Buch k i n e  geringe Vorstellung von der Denkktaft. Sprachgewalt, Gelehrsamkeit 
nnd profunden B~ldung seines Verfassers. Dennoch hat man uach beendeter Lektiire das Gefuht, 
als hntten wieder einmal Lreisende Berge ein armsetiges Miuslein geboren. Es wird ein ungeheures 
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Thema gesetzt, aber es wird im geringsten nicht gelost, es wird bestenfalls umschrieben. Etwas wie 
cine Entwichiungsgeschichte des deutschen Idealismus schwebte dem Verfasser vor; was er zustan- 
degebracht hat, sind doch nur einzelne, mehr oder minder gelungene, mehr oder minder originelle 
Skizzen zu einer brit~schen Gcschichte der deutschen Asthetik im Zeitalter des Idealismus. Was aber 
Geduld iind Nerven des Lesers auf die harteste Probe stellt, ist des Buches eigenwillige, iibertrieben 
barocke Sprache, die eher danach angetau ist, den Gedanken zu verbergen oder doch zu verdun- 
keln, als ihn zu offenbaren. Man sah den Most sich absurd gebirden und war begierig; was das 
spater fur einen Wein geben whrde (p. 456). 
2.) 
Ich habe uber den Verfasser ein strenges Gericht gehaiten. Ein zu strenges vielIeicht. Nicht aus 
Freude am Neinsagen, sondern im Gegenteil, weil ich ihn und sein Gemlchte fur so bedeutend 
halte, dap ich die strengsten Mapstabe nicht sowohl anwenden zu diirfen, als anwenden zu miissen 
meinte. Wer von sich selber aussagt, dap er "Hochstes und Schwerstes" anstrebe (Vorwort), will 
gewip nicht wie ein belieb~ger "Fachgenosse" mit Herablassung auf die Schulter geklopft sein; wer 
iiber Wolfflins Barockforschung urtellt, sie erschcine uberragend "mehr dank der Niedrigkeit der 
einschlagigen Arbeit seiner Zcitgenossen als dank absoluter Hohe des eignen Wuchses"; wet W. 
Scherers "amusische Verfassung" und gerlnge Sachkenntnis schilt und ihm vorwirft, e r  hltte "will- 
kiirlich und kumichtig ein perfides Zerrbild der Barockzeit zusammengekIittert" (S. 20),-4er 
fordert die unerbittlichste Kritik heraus. 
Abet trotz aller Einwande, Bedenken und Zweifel, die hier zu luQern waren, bleibt Cysarz' 
Schrift eine imponierende Erscheinung . . . . Und rein als Arbeitsleistung betrachtet, ringt das 
Buch einem den gropten Rcspekt ab. . . . Er  mu5  irn Biitzzugstempo gearbeitet haben, und das 
ist gewiP nicht die beste Art, Wissenschaft zu treiben. Die will bedachtsame Ruhe, gemachlichen 
Schritt . . . (p, 464). 
There is little doubt that Komer's concern for thorough and careful scholarship 
was the primary reason for this extremely critical, though, in  my opinion, not 
vicious, review of Cysarz. These two scholars were miles apart in  their 
philosophy and approach to literature, they belonged to different generations 
and milieu. Your letter points out the second phase of the apparently life-long 
debate on supposedly scholarly matters between these two members of the 
illustrious republic of letters (cf. Korner's judgment on "expressionistische 
Geistesgeschichte" in his Harzdbuch, p. 21% quoted in my article, p. 39). Accord- 
ing to your letter, one of them, certainly, seems to have overstepped the 
bounds of good taste and decency, when he was given the opportunity for a 
 rejoinder."^^ 
There are, I am sure, additional psychological and perhaps political explana- 
tions for the conduct of the men involved, but the whole affair is ugly and 
casts a Iong and gloomy shadow on the genuine aspirations of our profession 
even today. If scholars of great stature could behave this way in the twenties, 
what hope was there for the thirties? The harvest has been reaped a thousand- 
fold, the air been poisoned for many years to come. If I may repeat what I 
said in my article (now omitting the parentheses and stressing the predicate 
adjectives) "Scholarship, too, is not as pure and simple as a fairy-tale . . ." 
(P. 41). 
I believe, your account of these events should be made public in the interest 
of historical completeness. 
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